Extending trust management with cooperation incentives: a fully decentralized framework for user-centric network environments

Journal of Trust Management

Table 1 Frameworks and metrics comparison

Framework/metric	Fully decentralized	Sybil resistant	Incentives
Certain trust	✗	✗	✗
Martucci et al.	✗	✓	✗
Appleseed	✓	✗	✗
Eigen trust	✓	✗	✓
Feldman et al.	✓	✗	✓
Credible recommendations	✓	✗	✓
Bogliolo et al.	✓	✗	✓
Nuglets	✗	✓/✗^a	✓
Pirzada et al.	✓	✗	✓
Xing et al.	✓	✗	✗

^aWhile it provides means to greatly reduce Sybil attacks close to a full extent, it is not 100 % Sybil resistant (i.e. there are mechanisms to try to deter Sybil nodes or to detect them, but those not deterred or detected still are able to cheat)